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THE UNIFORM DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT
By EDWIN M. BORCHARD*
M iNNESOTAT is the thirtieth American state' to adopt in one
form or another the procedure for declaratory judgments,
and the eighteenth to adopt the Uniform Act. The bill proposing
it had been pending in the Minnesota legislature for a number of
years, and the Uniform Law Commissioners of Minnesota, not-
ably Mr. Donald E. Bridgman, had devoted much energy and in-
telligence to eliciting the experience of other states as to the prac-
tical operation of the act for the information of the Minnesota
legislature and, incidentally, of other states that had not yet
adopted it. Its passage, therefore, is something of a crowning
achievement of the public service of the Uniform Law Commis-
sioners of Minnesota.
The main characteristic of the declaratory judgment, which
distinguishes it from other judgments, is the fact that, by the act
authorizing it, courts are empowered to adjudicate upon disputed
legal rights "whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.'2
The judgment stops with the adjudication of the rights in issue
and is not remanded to a sheriff for execution. While the oppor-
tunity thus afforded for deciding legal issues without the appen-
dage of a coercive decree has enabled the courts to expand their
usefulness in the determination of disputes, the customary condi-
tions of adjudication are not thereby altered. So slight is the
*Professor of Law, Yale University School of Law, New Hai/en, Conn.
1Minnesota, Laws 1933, ch. 286, p. 372. In addition, Hawaii, the
Philippines, and Puerto Rico have adopted the statute.2
"Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have
power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not
further relief is or could be claimed. No action or proceeding shall be
open to objection, on the ground that a declaratory judgment or decree
is prayed for. The declaration may be either affirmative or negative in
form and effect; and such declarations shall have the force and effect
of a final judgment or decree." Uniform Act, sec. 1.
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modification effected by dispensing with a writ of execution3 that
it was adopted in England and elsewhere by mere rule of court.'
Moreover, English and American courts had from time imme-
morial rendered judgments construing wills, interpreting deeds,
trying disputed titles to property, real and personal, quieting title
and declaring the non-existence of clouds thereon, declaring a
plaintiff cestui or a supposed trust invalid, declaring the rights of
stockholders in corporations, the nullity of instruments and legal
relations, including marriage, the limitation of plaintiff's liability,
the obsolescence of covenants restricting the use of land, and
judgments in an infinite variety of other proceedings which end
in adjudications not requiring, and often not susceptible of, any
coercive decree.' These judgments declare the existence of rights
in doubt or uncertainty, rather than create new rights. Why there
should ever have been any question as to the strictly judicial na-
ture of the declaratory judgment is explainable only by the mis-
conception, now conclusively dissipated, that the declaratory judg-
ment was somehow the equivalent of an advisory opinion or the
decision of a moot case. Only on that assumption can one ex-
plain the early challenge to the constitutionality of the declaratory
judgment statute of Michigan,6 now repudiated at its source,7 and
',That a decree for execution is not an inherent part of any judg-
ment, see Fidelity Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v. Swope, (1927) 274 U. S.
123, 47 Sup. Ct. 511, 71 L. Ed. 959; Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue, (1929) 279 U. S. 716, 49 Sup. Ct. 499, 73
L. Ed. 918; Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Wallace, (1933)
288 U. S. 249, 53 Sup. Ct. 345, 77 L. Ed. 730.
4Order XXV, Rule 5, 1883, reads: "No action or proceeding shall
be open to objection, on the ground that a merely declaratory judg-
ment or order is sought thereby, and the court may make binding
declarations of right whether any consequential relief is or could be
claimed, or not." This rule has been adopted in most British jurisdic-
tions.5A few interesting Minnesota declaratory judgments may be men-
tioned. In Porten v. Peterson, (1918) 139 Minn. 152, 166 N. W. 183, a
vendee not yet entitled to specific performance because all the instal-
ments of the purchase price had not yet been paid sued the vendor, who
had repudiated the contract by refusing to receive further instalments,
for a judgment declaring his equitable title. In Slingerland v. Slinger-
land, (1910) 109 Minn. 407, 410, 124 N. W. 19, a woman sued her hus-
band for a judgment that a contract for the release of her dower was
void because obtained by fraud. In Deaver v. Napier, (1918) 139 Minn.
219, 166 N. W. 187, plaintiff holder of a fee title asked judgment under
statutory provisions settling the adverse claims of defendant, who held
a tax title.6Anway v. Grand Rapids Ry. Co., (1920) 211 Mich. 592, 179
N. W. 350.7Washington-Detroit Theatre Co. v. Moore, (1930) 249 Mich. 673,
229 N. W. 618.
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the oblique dicta of the United States Supreme Court,8 now over-
ruled unanimously in Nashille, Chattanwoga & St. Louis Ry. v.
Wallace.9 The issue of constitutionality should never have been
raised, for it never had a legitimate foundation. If considered at
all, it should have been settled by the remark of Judge Rodenbeck
that it was "not open to question." 10  The doubt unjustifiedly
created by erroneous assumptions as to the nature of declaratory
judgments nevertheless hampered the ready adoption of the pro-
cedure, a wider appreciation of its practical utility, and the en-
actment up to the present moment of the bill authorizing the fed-
eral courts to render declaratory judgments.1
AN ALTERNATIVE REKMEDY. But while the power to render
judgments without an appended coercive decree is not essentially
novel, its general recognition as a procedural institution has opened
the door to the adjudication of innumerable complaints and con-
troversies either (a) not theretofore capable of judicial relief or
(b) not theretofore prosecuted except for coercive relief. In this
second type of declaratory action, where "further relief," i. e.,
execution by way of injunction, damages, specific performance,
mandamus, could have been but is not claimed, the prayer for a
declaratory judgment alone evidences the fact that the plaintiff is
content with an adjudication of the disputed right, being satisfied
that the defendant will not require the state's coercion to carry
out the judgment. Should he refuse, however, section 8 of the
Uniform Act 112 enables the plaintiff on petition to obtain the neces-
8Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, (1927) 273 U. S. 70, 47 Sup. Ct.
282, 71 L. Ed. 541; Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, (1928) 277
U. S. 274, 48 Sup. Ct. 507, 72 L. Ed. 880.
9(1933) 288 U. S. 249, 53 Sup. Ct. 345, 77 L. Ed. 730. On the con-
stitutionality of the declaratory judgment, with a discussion of the
state and federal cases down to 1931, see Borchard in (1931) 31 Col. L.
Rev. 561. Since the fourteen state decisions upholding the constitu-
tionality of the act, there mentioned, the act has been sustained in
Lynn v. Kearney County, (1931) 121 Neb. 122, 236 N. W. 192; Faulk-
ner v. City of Keene, (1931) 85 N. H. 147, 155 Atl. 195; Holly Sugar
Co. v. Fritzler, (1931) 42 Wyo. 446, 296 Pac. 206; San Luis Water Co,
v. Trujillo, (Colo. 1933) (1933) 26 P. (2d) 537; Whiteside v. Merchants
Nat'l Bank, (Mass. 1933) 187 N. E. 706. See also Ellingwood in (1933)
28 11. L. Rev. 74.
1°Board of Ed. of Rochester v. Van Zandt, (1922) 119 Misc. Rep.
124, 127, 195 N. Y. S. 297, 300.
"The federal act has passed the House three times, but has been
held in the judiciary committee of the Senate, notwithstanding the fav-
orable report of a subcommittee. Early enactment now seems likely.
See Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary,
U. S. Senate, 70th Cong., 1st sess., on H. R. 5623 (1928).
'
2
"Further relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree may
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sary decree, for the judgment is res judicata. The declaratory
procedure in this case is an alternative remedy, and the occasional
suggestion in Pennsylvania, 13 Hawaii,' 4 Michigan' 5 and else-
where' that a declaratory judgment will not be rendered because
another remedy was available is an error of law and a flat con-
tradiction of the express words of the statute, which contemplates
that a declaratory judgment may be sought notwithstanding the
fact that an executory decree might have been prayed for. The
words "whether or not further relief is or could be claimed" should
have made that clear. While it is true that a declaratory judgment
is usually denied where a specific statutory remedy for a special
type of case has been provided,' 7 and while this limitation was
recognized by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Kariher's Pe-
tition,8 a leading case, the Pennsylvania court subsequently, with-
out realization of the mistake, misquoted its own words to the
effect that the declaration will be denied where "another statu-
tory remedy has been specially provided for the character of case
in hand" to make them read "another equally serviceable rem-
be granted whenever necessary or proper. The application therefor
shall be by petition to a court having jurisdiction to grant the relief.
If the application be deemed sufficient, the court shall, on reasonable
notice, require any adverse party whose rights have been adjudicated
by the declaratory judgment or decree, to show cause why further
relief should not be granted forthwith." Uniform Act, sec. 8.
'1Cf. Nesbitt v. Manufacturers' Casualty Ins. Co., (1933) 310 Pa.
St. 374, 165 Atl. 403.
'
4 Kaleikau v. Hall, (1923) 27 Hawaii 420.
'
5 Miller v. Siden, (1932) 259 Mich. 19, 242 N. W. 823. See (1932)
31 Mich. L. Rev. 180.
'6Lisbon Village Dist. v. Town of Lisbon, (1931) 85 N. H. 173, 174,
155 Atl. 252, 253; Green v. Inter-Ocean Casualty Co., (1932) 203 N. C.
767, 167 S. E. 38; Schmidt v. LaSalle Fire Ins. Co., (1932) 209 Wis.
576, 245 N. W. 702.
'
7Hoel v. Kansas City, (1930) 131 Kan. 290, 291 Pac. 780 (plaintiff
property owner sought declaration testing reasonableness of zoning
ordinance. Refused, because statute provided special action for dis-
satisfied taxpayer); Moore v. Louisville Hydro-Elec. Co., (1928) 226
Ky. 20, 10 S. W. (2d) 466 (workmen's compensation board the statu-
tory tribunal); Oldham County ex rel. Woolridge v. Arvin, (1932) 244
Ky. 551, 51 S. W. (2d) 657 (statutory appeal from administrative court
necessary); Haan v. Haan, (1928) 133 Misc. Rep. 197, 231 N. Y. S. 58
(court of special sessions has exclusive jurisdiction of declaration of
paternity and duty of maintenance); Barraclough v. Brown, [18971
A. C. 615, 66 L. J. Q. B. 672, 76 L. T. 797, 62 J. P. 275, 13 T. L. R. 527
(money expended on public works recoverable by statute in inferior
court).
18(1925) 284 Pa. St. 455, 471, 131 Atl. 265, 271. See also Taylor v.
Haverford Township, (1930) 299 Pa. St. 402, 149 Atl. 639, 641.
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edy,"'9 which in later cases evolved into the term "another estab-
lished remedy. ' 20 Thus, the declaratory judgment is mistakenly
characterized as if it were an extraordinary remedy, not to be em-
ployed where another remedy is available, a conclusion which can-
not be too firmly repudiated as in conflict with the statutes and
with the history and practice in England and the United States
generally. Were further evidence of the error required, it will
be found in the fact that it is common practice to combine the
prayer for a declaration with one for injunction or other coer-
cive relief, a practice which has the advantage of enabling the
court to issue the declaration while denying for any variety of
reasons the injunction,21 a denial which under traditional prac-
tice would result in a failure to decide the substantive issue and
thus leave the whole litigation abortive. 22 Indeed, the court itself,
in British jurisdictions, finding that injunction, damages, specific
performance, or other coercive relief requested cannot be given,
often sua sponte grants instead a declaration of rights, thus en-
abling the substantive issues to be decided and the case termi-
nated.23  That practice, in the light of the growing flexibility of
procedure, is worthy of emulation in the United States.
These declaratory actions, in which a coercive remedy might
have been sought but was not, ought to be encouraged, for they
19 Leafgreen v. La Bar, (1928) 293 Pa. St. 263, 142 Atl. 224.2 0Sterrett's Estate, (1930) 300 Pa. St. 116, 150 At!. 159, 162; In re
Cryan's Estate, (1930) 301 Pa. St. 386, 152 Atl. 675.2 1Sigal v. Wise, (1932) 114 Conn. 297, 158 Atl. 891; Craig, City
Comptroller, v. Commissioners of Sinking Fund, (1924) 208 App. Div.
412, 203 N. Y. S. 236; Erwin Billiard Parlor v. Buckner, (1927) 156
Tenn. 278, 300 S. W. 565; London Ass'n of Shipowners v. London &
India Docks, [1892] 3 Ch. 242, 62 L. J. Ch. 294, 67 L. T. 238, 8 T. L. R.
717; Atty. Gen. v. Merthyr Tydfil Union, [1900] 1 Ch. 516, 69 L. J.
Ch. 299, 82 L. T. 662, 64 J. P. 276, 48 W. R. 403, 16 T. L. R. 251.
2 21n Hurley v. Kincaid, (1932) 285 U. S. 95, 52 Sup. Ct. 267, 269,
76 L. Ed. 637, an injunction was sought against administrative officers
to determine whether they were privileged to endanger the plaintiff's
land by overflow; this required five separate and inconclusive court
arguments before the Supreme Court-without passing on the sub-
stantive issues-decided that he was not entitled to an injunction. It is
hardly conceivable that in England or in any other jurisdiction enjoy-
ing declaratory judgment procedure such an exhibition of judicial cir-
cuity would have been possible. See Jennings, Declaratory Judgments
against Public Authorities in England, (1932) 41 Yale L. J. 407.
2 3 Evans v. Manchester, Sheffield & L. Ry. Co., (1887) 36 Ch. D.
626, 57 L. J. Ch. 153, 57 L. T. 194, 36 W. R. 328; Vestry of the Parish
of St. Mary Islington v. Hornsey Urban Council, [1900] 1 Ch. 695, 69
L. J. Ch. 324, 82 L. T. 580, 48 W. R. 401; Behrens v. Richards, [1905]
2 Ch. 614, 74 L. J. Ch. 615, 93 L. T. 623, 69 J. P. 381; Knight v. Bolton,
[1924] N. Z. L. R. 806, 1043.
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manifest the important social function of deciding controversies
at their inception-thus avoiding embittered relations and perhaps
irretrievable losses-and enable a plaintiff to seek a mild rather
than a drastic remedy with all its consequences. They assume that
the operative facts, such as breach or other overt "wrong," which
condition the traditional remedy, have actually occurred. Yet
they recognize the value of an option in the prayers for relief.
They recognize that the prayer for relief does not condition or
determine the cause of action and that the plaintiff, in the absence
of some public reason, should have a free choice of remedies. They
recognize that the same state of facts may give rise to a variety of
legal interests, justifying a variety of relief, and that it is not a
judicial function to force upon the claimant a drastic remedy
when a mild one will suffice. A procedure for adjudicating con-
flicting claims of right which leaves the parties amicable and the
social and economic relations unimpaired seems preferable to a
requirement of violence, acrimonious hostility, and perhaps per-
manently sundered relations.
WHEN EXCLUSIVE. It is, however, the more spectacular uses
of the declaratory judgment, designed to negative a claim or cloud
emanating from the defendant, or to assert the plaintiff's privilege
or immunity or the defendant's no-right or disability to impair
the plaintiff's interests, that have attracted more striking attention.
Here the declaratory judgment is an exclusive remedy, for there
is no other way in which the plaintiff's interests can be judicially
protected, unless the defendant proceeds so far, by threat or vio-
lence, as to lay the foundation for an injunction or damages. Op-
portunity for judicial relief in these cases enables a plaintiff to try
a disputed issue before a breach or overt "wrong" has occurred,
and enables him to look before he leaps and thus escape peril, in-
security, and dilemma. In this classification may be included the
many cases in which a plaintiff seeks a declaration that he is not
liable, as claimed, or that he is privileged to act, for example, to
build a structure, notwithstanding a purported but disputed re-
striction in a covenant; that he is released from the obligations of
a contract because of changed conditions by natural or human
events, such as war or fire; that a plaintiff is free to assign, not-
withstanding a threat of forfeiture or breach if he does so, thus
permitting adjudication to precede rather than follow an overt
act, possibly mistaken; cases in which plaintiff debtors sue their
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creditors for a declaration of their non-liability or limited liability
only; in which a plaintiff claims privileges, such as that of sale,
mortgage, easement, etc., free from the contrary claims of the de-
fendant; in which plaintiffs seek privileges or immunities against
the Government, such as immunity from taxation, especially where
injunction is impossible,24 or immunity from license, zoning re-
quirement, other governmental restriction, or even criminal prose-
cution; in which administrative officials seek a declaration of their
privilege to act, without incurring liability either to private parties
or the government, thereby enabling public acts to be undertaken
free from the cloud of illegality and penalty. 25 Claims of validity
by the one challenged are as justiciable as claims of invalidity by
the challenger. As the United States Supreme Court remarked
in a case in which a city brought an action for the declaration of
the validity of certain improvement bonds it was about to issue:
"[The issue] cannot be deemed any the less so [a case or con-
troversy] because through a modified procedure the parties are
reversed and the same issues raised are finally determined at the
behest of the city."26
It is this type of case, in which the plaintiff often seeks a
declaration to the effect that he is under no duty to the defendant,27
that accounts for the clause in section 1 of the Uniform Act that
the declaration may be given in "affirmative" or "negative" form,
for there is as much legal interest in disclaiming an asserted lia-
bility as in invoking one. This type of case also accounts for the
special provision of section 3 of the Uniform Act to the effect
that "a contract may be construed either before or after there has
been a breach thereof." The opportunity of deciding a dispute
as to the construction or interpretation of a contract before either
party has taken the drastic and possibly fatal step of purported
breach serves to stabilize contractual relations, makes breach un-
necessary as a condition of adjudication of the dispute, and pre-
serves the status quo and the legal structure from impairment or
24This was the fact situation in Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis
Ry. v. Wallace, (1933) 288 U. S. 249, 53 Sup. Ct. 345, 77 L. Ed. 730.25An extensive description and analysis of the many types of cases
illustrating this need of declaratory adjudication will be found in the
article, Borchard. Judicial Relief for Peril and Insecurity, (1932) 45
Harv. L. Rev. 793, 845, and in its successor, Borchard, Judicial Relief
for Insecurity, (1933) 33 Col. L. Rev. 648.
26Fidelity Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Swope, (1927) 274 U. S. 123,
131, 47 Sup. Ct. 511, 514, 71 L. Ed. 959.27Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Hannay & Co., [1915] 2 K.
B. 536, 84 L. J. K. B. 1465, 113 L. T. 98.
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ruin, while interpreting it when dispute arises. Here we find the
new types of legal interest which now receive judicial protection.
Equity grew in usefulness by recognizing such new interests; the
declaratory action is an exemplification of the same process. There
is no less justiciability in the construction of a contract or other
instrument than there is in the construction of a will; and it
ought to be generally recognized that the vindication of assailed
or challenged rights, the clarification and stabilization of unsettled
legal relations, the removal of legal clouds which create peril, in-
security, fears, and doubts-in short, the establishment of social
peace in the community, without the necessity for prior violence,
is the primary social function. The destruction of the status quo
is no longer a necessary condition of a justiciable issue.
JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE
The Uniform Act provides that "courts of record within their
respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights," etc.
This language was intended to indicate, first, that existing juris-
diction over parties and subject-matter was not meant to be altered,
and secondly, that only a "new" procedural device or vehicle of
relief was afforded. As already observed, the procedure is not
really novel, for, without mentioning its identifying name as de-
claratory relief, it has long been used by courts of equity; the
statute is, in effect, merely a direction to use a long-existing and
often exerted power.
That the action for a declaration affects exclusively "matters
of practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of procedure" has
been stated so often as hardly to require iteration .2  The proce-
dure should, therefore, have been admitted in the federal courts
without federal statute in law cases under the Conformity Act and
in equity cases under traditional practice. 29  While the declara-
tory action has its historical source in equity procedure, de-
28Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Wallace, (1933) 288
U. S. 249, 264, 53 Sup. Ct. 345, 348, 77 L. Ed. 730; Morton v. Pacific
Constr. Co., (1929) 36 Ariz. 97, 283 Pac. 281; Braman v. Babcock, (1923)
98 Conn. 549, 120 AtI. 150; Sheldon v. Powell, (1930) 99 Fla. 782, 128
So. 258, 263; Aaron v. Woodcock, (1925) 283 Pa. St. 33, 128 Atl. 665;
Barraclough v. Brown, [1897] A. C. 615, 624, 66 L. J. Q. B. 672, 76
L. T. 797, 62 J. P. 275, 13 T. L. R. 527; Guaranty Trust Co. of New
York v. Hannay & Co., [1915] 2 K. B. 536, 563, 568, 84 L. J. K. B.
1465, 113 L. T. 98.
29(1872) 17 Stat. at L. 197, U. S. Comp. Stat. (1916) sec. 1537. See
comment, Ineffectiveness of the Conformity Act, (1927) 36 Yale L. J.
853.
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claratory relief is neither essentially equitable nor legal in charac-
ter, but is special and sui generis, applicable in any court.30 But
because of the requirement that proceedings for declarations must
be brought in courts having "jurisdiction," the courts of states
like New Jersey, where equity and law are administered in sepa-
rate courts, have been very strict in refusing to declare a legal
right in a court of equity or an equitable right in a court of law.3'
This effective denial of justice is a result of a historical division
of jurisdiction which no longer has a sound justification in effi-
cient administration and, apart from the frequent intermingling
of the two classes of rights, often requires an unusual prescience
in forecasting distinctions that the court may draw. The New
Jersey difficulty could have been overcome by adopting the sound
view that declaratory relief is inherently neither legal nor equit-
able, but sui generis.
But for the case of Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis,32 now
overruled in its suggestion that a declaratory judgment was an
advisory opinion,33 it was possibly not necessary to propose a spe-
cial statute enabling the federal courts to render declaratory judg-
ments, at least in law cases arising in those states whose courts
have power to render such judgments. In equity cases, the fed-
eral courts might have exercised their traditional powers. But in
view of the turn of events, it may be necessary, even in those
states that authorize declaratory judgments, to await the enact-
ment of the pending federal bill before such actions can be safely
brought in the federal courts, unless in cases at law the Supreme
Court were to overrule, as it should, the assumption of the Grannis
Case that an action for a declaration of rights is not a matter of
"practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of procedure," and in
equity the federal courts were to apply their inherent power to
30Village of Grosse Pointe Shores v. Ayres, (1931) 254 Mich. 58,
235 N. W. 829: Chapman v. Michaelson, [1908] 2 Ch. 612, [1909] 1 Ch.
238, 78 L. J. Ch. 272, 100 L. T. 109, 25 T. L. R. 101; Ansford v. New
Plymouth Finance Co., [1933] N. Z. L. R. 209. Only in New South
Wales, Florida and Rhode Island is the relief confined to equitable rights.
I-andover v. Langman, (1929) 29 N. S. W. St. R. 435, 43 C. L. R. 334;
Florida, Laws 1919, ch. 7857. sec. 1; Florida Gen. Laws 1927 sec. 4953;
Rhode Island Comp. Laws, 1923, sec. 4952.
85See the New Jersey cases discussed in (1932) 1 Mercer Beasley
Lnw Rev. 1 et seq., and Yuras v. Muscowic, (1933) 114 N. J. Eq. 126,
168 Atl. 657.
82(1927) 273 U. S. 70, 47 Sup. Ct. 282, 71 L. Ed. 541.
OsSee Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Wallace, (1933)
288 U. S. 249, 53 Sup. Ct. 345, 77 L. Ed. 730.
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render declaratory judgments. 34 The same considerations probably
apply to the removal of causes from state to federal courts. So
far as concerns the power of the federal Supreme Court to review
state declaratory judgments, that question has been affirmatively
settled by the recent decision in Nashville, Chattanooga & St.
Louis Ry. v. Wallace.
The action for a declaration follows the procedure in civil
cases generally. 5 The fact that the issue usually involves one of
law only and that the procedure is uniformly simple and expedi-
tious probably accounts for the fact that in the statutes of Calif or-
nia, Kentucky, and Michigan the action for a declaratory judg-
ment is given a preferred place on the calendar. The frequent
need for prompt adjudication to avoid danger and dilemma and
the simplification of issues necessarily involved dictate the desir-
ability of rules in all states designed to insure the expediting of
trials for a declaration of rights. Lawyers do well to frame their
prayers for relief as a request or requests for specific findings of
fact or law, in order to avoid any possibility of a court's conclud-
ing that a non-adversary proceeding for an advisory opinion is in-
volved, although the British courts with their long experience are
never misled by a prayer asking them to decide "whether" the
plaintiff or the defendant is correct in his contention. The judg-
ment is res judicata and reviewable, as any other judgment is.3 6
Appeal is subject to the regular periods under conventional rules,
except where, as in Kentucky, the period has been shortened be-
cause the action is deemed an instrument of summary or speedy
341n Harr v. Pioneer Mechanical Corp. (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1933) 65 F.(2d)332, an action for declaratory judgment and injunction removed from a
New York state to a federal court, denied injunction but retained jurisdic-
tion to declare rights of parties. Cf. (1933) 12 N. C. L. Rev. 57. The
common source of the procedure for declarations of right in English
law and practice made it seem desirable that the practice and construction
in American jurisdictions should be uniform. Hence the numerous sections
of the act, expressing much of the law and practice in statutory form, and
the. provision of section 15, aiming at uniformity of interpretation through-
out the states and harmony with federal laws and regulations on the subject.
S5 The New York rules (rule 210) provide that the declaratory
action "in matters of procedure shall follow the forms and practice pre-
scribed in the civil practice act and rules for other actions in [the su-
preme] court." Connecticut, Practice Book, sec. 64 (a): Newsum v.
Interstate Realty Co., (1925) 152 Tenn. 302, 278 S. W. 56.56See sec. 1 of Uniform Act, supra note 2. Sec. 7 provides that
"all orders, judgments, and decrees under this act may be reviewed as
[are] other orders, judgments, and decrees."
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adjudication.3 7 Costs, usually much below the traditional amount,
may be awarded. s
SCOPE OF DECLARATORY RELIEF
There is no legal question which cannot become the subject of
a declaration, and section 1 of the act 9 indicates the breadth of
its scope. Sections 2, 3, and 4 are mainly specifications for the
purpose of guidance.
WRITTEN INSTRUMENTS. Section 2 of the Uniform Act reads
as follows:
"Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract, or
other writings constituting a contract, or whose rights, status, or
other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance,
contract, or franchise, may have determined any question of con-
struction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordi-
nance, contract, or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights,
status, or other legal relations thereunder."
This section finds its source in Order LIV A of the English
Rules of Court of 1893,40 but is more specific and possibly nar-
37The appeal period in Kentucky is limited to 60 days from date of
Judgment. This period is jurisdictional, and cannot be waived by con-
sent. Sec. 5 of Kentucky Declaratory Judgments Act, Kentucky Acts
1922, ch. 83; City of Corbin v. Underwood, (1927) 221 Ky 413, 298
S. W. 1090: Chicago-Kentucky Coal Co. v. Auxier, (1931) 239 Ky. 442,
39 S. W. (2d) 662.38West v. Gwynne, [1911] 2 Ch. 1, 80 L. J. Ch. 578, 104 L. T. 759,
27 T. L. R. 444; Grant v. Knaresborough Urban Council, [1928] Ch. 310,
97 L. J. Ch. 106, 138 L. T. 488, 92 J. P. 30; In re Campbell; Peacock v.
Ewen, [1930] N. Z. L. R. 713.
Section 10 of the Uniform Act provides that costs may be awarded
"as may seem equitable and just." In Kansas, Kentucky, Hawaii, and
Mifichigan, the act provides that the parties may stipulate in reference to
costs. Section 10 leaves the award of costs discretionary with the
court, as it generally is in other English-speaking jurisdictions. Thus,
in Mullens v. Mullens, (1927) 5 Tenn. App. 235, an action to construe a
will and to declare title, costs were decreed against the successful plain-
tiff. Cf. In re Gore Borouah Council, [1909] 29 N. Z. L. R. 192. In Eng-
land, the declaratory order is frequently not accompanied by costs,
which are generally heavier than in the United States, probably be-
cause neither party could be deemed delinquent or culpably wrong.
Tenkins v. Price, r19071 2 Ch. 229. 235. 76 L. T. Ch. 507, 23 T. L. R. 608;
Evans v. Levy, [1910] 1 Ch. 452, 79 L. J. Ch. 383, 102 L. T. 128. In
Rosenberq v. Village of Whitefish Bay, (1929) 199 Wis. 214. 225 N. W.
838. in which Dlaintiff claimed immunity from a zoning ordinance, the
appellate court disallowed costs to either party, on the ground that
both were justified in appealing. See discussion of costs under sec. 13
of the New Zealand Act of 1908 in In re Campbell; Peacock v. Ewen,
f19301 N. Z. L. R. 713.89Supra note 2.
40
"In any division of the high court, any person claiming to be in-
terested under a deed, will, or other written instrument, may apply by
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rower. Whereas the English Order refers to rights derived from
a "deed, will, or other written instrument," the Uniform Act
speaks of a "deed, will, written contract, or other writings con-
stituting a contract."'1  The English courts very frequently con-
strue statutes and rights derived from statutes, but whether this
is done under order 25 or order 54 is not altogether clear.4 2 In-
asmuch as statutes, ordinances, and public contracts are a major
object of judicial challenge in the United States, special mention
is made of this type of instrument in the Uniform Act. Construc-
tion doubtless includes interpretation or application of the statute
to a particular fact situation.
43
Section 4 of the Uniform Act deals specifically with the con-
struction of wills and trusts, which at first constituted, and possibly
still furnishes, the largest proportion of issues determined in the
English courts by declaration.4 4 Any persons interested in these
matters can raise the issue against a qualified adversary; so far
as concerns executors, trustees, and others acting in a fiduciary
capacity, it merely codifies a well-established branch of equity
jurisdiction, while re-enacting a statutory provision common to
many states in authorizing the construction of wills and analogous
instruments.
originating summons for the determination of any question of construc-
tion arising under the instrument, and for a declaration of the rights of
the persons interested." This rule is to be found in nearly all British
jurisdictions.
41Oregon recently added the words "enforceable oral contract"
(Oregon, Laws 1931 ch. 8) to the scope of declaratory relief. The
California court has refused to declare rights under an oral contract.
Transport Oil Co. v. Bush, (1931) 114 Cal. App. 152, 1 P. (2d) 1060;
but this decision may be deemed overruled by Herrlein v. Tocchini, (1933)
128 Cal. App. 612, 18 P. (2d) 73. Section 1 of the Uniform Act is suffi-
ciently broad to include oral contracts.
42 Order 54 A is merely a more detailed expression of the general
powers conferred by order 25, rule 5. So, section 2 of the Uniform Act
bears an identical relation to section 1.
43Some of the cases in the United States in which statutes and or-
dinances have been construed and interpreted are discussed in the com-
ment in (1932) 41 Yale L. J. 1195.
44"Any person interested as or through an executor, administrator,
trustee, guardian, or other fiduciary, creditor, devisee, legatee, heir, next
of kin or cestui que trust, in the administration of a trust, or of the
estate of a decedent, an infant, lunatic, or insolvent, may have a declara-
tion of rights or legal relations in respect thereto:
(a) To ascertain any class of creditors, devisees, legatees, heirs,
next of kin, or others; or
(b) To direct the executors, administrators, or trustees to do or
abstain from doing any particular act in their fiduciary capacity; or
(c) To determine any question arising in the administration of the
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To remove all doubt as to the effect of the enumeration in
sections 2, 3, and 4 of the Uniform Act on matters within the
scope of declaratory relief, section 5 provides that the enumera-
tion "does not limit or restrict the exercise.of the general powers"
conferred by section 1, which extends to any type of controversy
concerning legal relations. Section 5 was included by way of pre-
caution against narrow inferences and was hardly essential, be-
cause the broader statutes granting general unspecified authority
to render declaratory judgments, with the implementing rules of
procedure, as in New York, Connecticut, and other states, embrace
the powers conferred by section 1 of the Uniform Act, and have
been considered as affording an unlimited scope to the application
of declaratory relief.
FACTS. The ostensible restriction of the declaratory power to
jural relations has given rise to the inference and frequent state-
ment that facts cannot be declared. Yet an examination of the
decisions will show that the refusal to declare facts in a particular
case was based upon the inconvenience and impropriety of deter-
mining complicated issues of fact by a declaratory action in a par-
ticular case, either at all' 5 or without a jury trial, which had not
been arranged for.48 The dismissal is based, therefore, not on
principle, but on convenience, a matter within judicial discretion,4
for it is true that the declaration, as a summary method of trying
an issue, is in the main employed where the facts are not in dis-
pute48 or where they are not complicated. Where they are very
much involved and the taking of testimony would necessarily be
time-consuming, the declaratory procedure is not the most adapt-
able, and it is for that reason that declarations have often been
-refused, even though the ground may have been stated more
broadly. It is not convenient for a court to declare summarily
estate or trust, including questions of construction of wills and other
writings." Uniform Act, sec. 4.
-
5 Transport Oil Co. v. Bush, (1931) 114 Cal. 152, 1 P. (2d) 1060;
Lockwood v. Lockwood, (1930) 98 Pa. Super. Ct. 426; Faber v. Gos-
worth Urban Dist. Council, (1903) 88 L. T. 549, 67 J. P. 197, 19 T. L. R.
435; In re Robert Grew; Cannaway v. Cannaway, (1903) 29 Victorian
L. R. 324, (1904) 29 Victorian L. R. 628, 630.4oSupreme Tent of Knights of Maccabees of World v. Dupriest,
(1930) 235 Ky. 46, 29 S. W. (2d) 599; In re Jenkins Township Fire
Truck, (1928) 25 Luz. Leg. Reg. R. 144; Gray v. Lee, (1927) 44 Montg.
Co. Law Rep. 1.
47See infra p. 261.
48Beadle v. Perpetual Trustees, Estate & Agency Co., etc., (1912)
32 N. Z. L. R. 92.
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whether a particular establishment is a nuisance 5 and quite im-
possible to say whether a building not yet constructed will be a
nuisance. 50 So, a court may readily conclude within its discretion
not to pass on the disputed terms or nature of an oral contract,5 or
decide whether the insured committed suicide,5 2 or whether a cer-
tain consignment of potatoes to plaintiff was in lieu of interest or
constituted a gift,53 or whether the plaintiff had properly been
divorced by defendant and the nature of defendant's relations with
another woman, 5 ' and in some cases, that the issues should be
tried by a jury, as permitted by the statute.
It is manifest that, even before the enactment of general sta-
tutes authorizing declarations, courts in western countries made
aeclarations of fact, such as declarations of death, paternity, legi-
timacy,55 insanity. 56 It is, of course, not always easy to define the
nature of a fact as such, and to distinguish clearly the conclusion
which depends on testimony from that which is derived exclu-
sively from legal reasoning, a difficulty which often provokes the
label "mixed question" of law and fact. Yet in whichever cate-
gory the issue falls, whether testimony needs to be taken or not,
there can be no doubt that both narrow questions, such as the
identity or nationality of a particular person57 or the character or
geographical location of a building or property,58 and broad ques-
49Cuneo Eastern Press, Inc. v. Astrowsky, (1930) 231 App. Div.
861, 246 N. Y. S. 510; Attorney-General v. Roe, [1915] 1 Ch. 235, 240,
84 L. J. Ch. 322, 112 L. T. 581, 79 J. P. 263.5 OWardrop Co. v. Fairfield Gardens, (1933) 237 App. Div. 605, 262
N. Y. S. 95; Ladner v. Siegel, (1928) 294 Pa. St. 368, 372, 144 Atl. 274.
51Transport Oil Co. v. Bush, (1931) 114 Cal. App. 152, 1 P. (2d)
1060.5 2Aetna L. Ins. Co. v. Bellos, (1929) 158 Tenn. 554, 13 S. W. (2d)
795, 14 S. W. (2d) 961.
-
5 Beamish v. Whitney, [1908] 1 Ir. R. 38.
54Lockwood v. Lockwood, (1930) 98 Pa. Super. Ct. 426.5 5Morecroft v. Taylor, (1929) 225 App. Div. 562, 234 N. Y. S. 2;
Miller v. Currie, (1932) 208 Wis. 199, 242 N. W. 570; In the Will of
Sayer, [1921] Victorian L. R. 95, 27 Argus L. R. 30, 42 A. L. T. 137.
5 Mackintosh v. Smith & Lowe, (1865) 4 Macq. (Scot.) 913.57 Braman v. Babcock, (1923) 98 Conn. 549, 120 Atd. 150; In re
Robert Grew; Cannaway v. Cannaway, (1903) 29 Victorian L. R. 324,
(1904) 29 Victorian L. R. 628; Groebel v. Administrator of Hungarian
Property, (1926) 70 Sol. J. 345.
5 8Saunders-Jacob v. Yates, [1933] 1 K. B. 392, 102 L. J. 417; Ruis-
lip-Northwood Urban Dist. Council v. Lee, (1931) 145 L. T. R. 208, 95
J. P. 164; Hulston v. Cameron, [1927] N. Z. L. R. 382; Lofthouse Col-
liery v. Ogden, [1913] 3 K. B. 120; 82 L. J. K. B. 910, 107 L. T. 827, 29
T. L. R. 179; Barwick v. South Eastern & Chatham Ry. Cos., [1921] 1
K. B. 187, 90 L. J. K. B. 377, 124 L. T. 71, 85 J. P. 65, aff'g [1920] 2
K. B. 387.
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tions in a more complex setting,5 9 can be determined by declaration.
FACTS AS INCIDENTAL TO LEGAL CONCLUSIONS. But whatever
supposed disinclination there may be in England to declare bare
facts apart from their legal consequences, there can be no question
that the courts continually determine facts as incidental to legal
conclusions. Thus, in the construction of a will and the validity of
a power of appointment thereunder, it became necessary to deter-
mine the domicil of the testatrix, and whether her will had been
executed in accordance with the lex domicilii and purported to
execute the power.60 So in Chapman v. Michaelson,6' in establish-
ing the invalidity of a certain mortgage, the court had to deter-
mine that the mortgagee entered into the mortgage as a money-
lender and that he was not in fact registered.
In the United States there can be little doubt about the power
59Hess v. Country Club Park, (1931) 213 Cal. 613, 2 P. (2d) 782
(change of neighborhood, so as to release from restrictive covenant);
R. G. Hamilton Corp. v. Corum, (Cal. 1933) 21 P. (2d) 413 (dispute
under trust agreement); Tolle v. Struve, (1932) 124 Cal. App. 263, 12
P. (2d) 61 (faulty construction of building, justifying release from con-
tract); Herrlein v. Tocchini, (1933) 128 Cal. App. 612, 18 P. (2d) 73
(contract for sale of stock, disputed); Sigal v. Wise, (1932) 114 Conn.
297, 158 AtI. 891 (that defendant had taken steps to defeat plaintiff's
right to have lease renewed after restoration of burned building); More-
croft v. Taylor, (1929) 225 App. Div. 562, 234 N. Y. S. 2 (plaintiff
claimed she was illegitimate daughter of defendant); Morris v. Morris,
(1930) 13 D. & C. (Pa.) 634 (trustee's petition to determine interest
taken by devisee under facts, and whether conditions violated); Swank
Motor Sales Co. v. Decker, (1932) 4 Cambria Co. R. (Pa.) 28 (whether
car delivered in damaged condition); Elsdon v. Hampstead Corp.,
[1905] 2 Ch. 633, 75 L. J. Ch. 27, 93 L. T. 335, 54 W. R. 43 (special
assessment; whether certain property benefited); Attorney-General v.
Roe, [1915] 1 Ch. 235, 84 L. J. Ch. 322, 112 L. T. 581, 79 J. P. 263
(existence of nuisance determined in proceeding to abate); MacDonald
v. Great Western Ry. Co., [1930] 1 Ch. 364, 371, 99 L. J. Ch. 164, 142
L. T. 460 (that plaintiff employees' claims for losses under a certain
statute, submitted to defendant, had not been determined by the de-
fendant within the meaning of the statute. By Maugham, J.: "The mat-
ter involved is mainly a question of fact: but there is also involved in it
something which, I think, requires a consideration of the statutes as a
result of which the claims were made"); Nicholls v. Nicholls, (1899)
81 L. T. R. 811 (whether road was way of necessity); Smith v. Attor-
ney-General for Ontario, (1923) 53 Ont. L. R. 572 (truth of legislative
resolution); Murphy v. Lawler, [1918] N. Z. L. R. 605 (testator's testa-
mentary capacity).
6 0In re Wilkinson's Settlement; Butler v. Wilkinson, [19171 1 Ch.
620, 86 L. J. Ch. 511, 117 L. T. 81, 33 T. L. R. 267; see also In re Price;
Tomlin v. Latter, [1900] 1 Ch. 442, 447, 69 L. J. Ch. 225, 82 L. T. 79, 48
W. R. 373, 16 T. L. R. 189.
6'[1908] 2 Ch. 612, aff'd, [1909] 1 Ch. 238. In India, a declaration
was made that certain fixtures were erected before a certain date.
Azeeza J. S. Joseph v. Corporation of Calcutta, (1916) 24 Calcutta L. 3.
498.
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of the court to determine facts when necessary or incidental to the
declaration of legal relations. It is even probable that under the
provision that "no action or proceeding shall be open to objection
on the ground that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed
for"62 declarations of a pure fact may be granted. For example,
it should have been possible under the New York Civil Practice
Act, had it then been in force, for Theodore Dreiser to obtain a
declaration against the John Lane Co. that "The Genius" was not
obscene, after the latter had refused to publish it because of
threats of criminal prosecution by the Society for the Suppression
of Vice, and thus to establish whether or not the publisher was, as
claimed by Dreiser, violating the contract by refusing to publish.63
JURY TRIAL. Section 9 of the Uniform Act provides:
"When a proceeding under this act involves the determination
of an issue of fact, such issue may be tried and determined in the
same manner as issues of fact are tried and determined in other
civil actions in the court in which the proceeding is pending.64
The question has arisen whether this provision requires a jury
trial in every case, or whether such trial depends upon whether the
issue is legal or equitable. 65 It may be said that the draftsmen of
the Uniform Act included the provision with the sole purpose of
refuting any constitutional doubt on the point; it was not intended
62Uniform Act, sec. 1.
63Dreiser v. John Lane Co., (1918) 183 App. Div. 773, 171 N. Y.
S. 605. The parties agreed to submit the question of violation of con-
tract on an agreed statement of facts. The only point in issue was the
question whether the book was obscene. It was held that as this was a
question of fact it was not a proper question for judicial determination
on voluntary submission. The only method then left to the plaintiff
would have been to sue for damages for loss of royalty-not easy to
prove-and thus enable a jury to determine whether the book was ob-
scene. This compulsory show of hostilities is probably now unneces-
sary, under sec. 473, C. P. A., and rule 213.
64The Kansas Act (Laws 1921, ch. 168, sec. 4) provides that "when
a declaration of right or the granting of further relief based thereon
shall involve the determination of issues of fact triable by a jury, such
issues may be submitted to a jury in the form of interrogatories, with
proper instructions by the court, whether a general verdict be required
or not." See Hawaii, Rev. Laws 1925, sec. 2921: Ky. Codes (Carroll,
1927) secs. 639a-7; Michigan, Acts 1929, no. 36 Comp. Laws 1929, sec.
13906, which adds "and such interrogatories and answers shall consti-
tute a part of the record of the case." See also New York Rule 213,
and Connecticut, Practice Book 1922, sec. 64 (f).
Sec. 4 (a) of the Uniform Act confers on executors, trustees, etc.,
the privilege of ascertaining "any class of creditors, devisees, legatees,
heirs, next of kin, or others" and (c) "to determine any question aris-
ing in the administration of the estate or trust."
65Gavit, Procedure Under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act,
(1933) 8 Ind. L. J. 409 at 418 et seq.
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to indicate that the declaratory action is either equitable or legal
or to indicate that jury trial is necessary in any case. Declaratory
relief is neither strictly equitable nor legal, although, as has been
observed, its historical sources are almost exclusively equitable.
Where the two systems are still separately administered, as in New
Jersey, courts of equity have occasionally refused to consider a
common law question, not on the ground that it required a jury
trial but on the jurisdictional clause of the statute. Where the two
systems are not independently administered, the courts are left to
determine under local practide whether a jury trial must or can be
demanded, whether, if demanded, it must be granted, and whether
silence is a waiver. There is no mention of jury trial in the de-
claratory judgment statutes of California, Connecticut, Florida,
New Hampshire, New York, or South Carolina; yet it is not to be
doubted that the usual constitutional provisions for jury trial pre-
vail. 6 There was no necessity for mention of jury trial in the
Uniform Act except to give an assurance that the matter had not
been overlooked and that the usual rules adopted by the state for
the classification of civil issues and their trial were not intended
to be interfered with. Jury trial for issues of fact need not be
claimed; it wuay be claimed. If it is, the procedure shall follow
that adopted in the case of other civil actions in that court. Kansas
and a few other states provide for reference of the issue to the
jury on interrogatories. There was no intention to break new
ground or to strengthen or weaken jury trial. In practice, almost
uniformly, issues of fact have been tried by the court alone, as in
equity. Where this seemed not feasible, either because the facts
were too complicated to warrant trial and findings by declaratory
procedure or because the court considered a jury trial necessary
under the circumstances, the declaration has in the court's discre-
tion been refused,67 although the court in the latter case might
have retained jurisdiction pending reference to a jury if properly
claimed. The provisions for a jury trial are a safeguard against
the definite dismissal of the case when issues of fact arise the
jury trial of which may be and is properly claimed, and an as-
surance to possible doubters that constitutional guaranties have
not been overlooked.
66Cf. Faulkner v. City of Keene. (1931) 85 N. H. 147, 155 Atl. 195,
197, 200. New York and Connecticut by Rules of Court assimilate
the practice to that prevailing in other actions. In New York, the
court may direct the submission of facts to a jury (Rule 213). In Con-
necticut. they "may be submitted to the jury as in other actions."671nfra p. 261.
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FUTURE INTERESTS. Not a little confusion has been created
by occasional rulings or dicta to the effect that a court will not de-
clare "future rights." The statement is ambiguous and calls for
analysis and clarification. Courts appropriately decline to pass
upon the effect of remote contingencies which may never happen.
If they did, they would constitute themselves academic advisers
and disposers of hypothetical issues, a function clearly not judicial.
On the other hand, not every event which may happen in the fu-
ture forecloses present interest in its legal effects. The construc-
tion of wills frequently necessitates the determination of the ef-
fect of a future death on interests in realty. If the operative
event is about to occur or practically certain to occur, and it serves
a present clarifying and stabilizing purpose to establish its effect
(provided all parties in interest are heard), there is no reason why
the courts should refuse their aid in adjudicating conflicting claims
depending upon the certain event. Distinction must therefore be
made between the effect of events fairly certain to occur and of
events remote, speculative, and conjectural. The early indisposi-
tion of the English courts to pass upon the interests of remainder-
men and reversioners produced a certain conservatism in passing
upon or deciding questions which involved operative facts which
could only arise or effects which could only take place in the fu-
ture. But the development of commerce, the need for adjudicat-
ing present claims to future benefits or in disavowal of future
liabilities, the lifting of the restrictions upon the interpretation of
the Chancery Procedure Act of 1852 by Order XXV, rule 5, the
search for the "legal interest" of the parties-an expanding con-
ception-as a criterion of the right to a decision, the growing reali-
zation of the utility of the declaratory judgment as an instrument
of preventive justice, quieting title and guiding future conduct-
all served to liberate the courts from the fetters of ancient maxims
which had but little relation to current demands for judicial re-
lief from uncertainty and insecurity. It is in fact in its operation
in futuro as a stabilizer of legal relations and an authoritative
warning against untoward and misguided conduct that the declara-
tion performs possibly its major function. A plaintiff demonstrat-
ing a sufficient interest is entitled to a determination of his present
and future legal relations to the defendant, provided always that
the operative facts are so definite and practically certain that the
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court runs no risk of deciding academic, abstract, hypothetical,
purely contingent, or speculative questions s
PURPOSE
The essential purposes of the declaratory judgment may be said
to be
(1) to afford a speedy and inexpensive method of adjudicating
legal disputes;"'
(2) to narrow the issues and, by so doing, to dispose of dis-
putes in their initial stages, before they have become full-grown
battles with their accumulation of bitterness and impaired rela-
tions ;70
(3) to make it unnecessary to destroy the status quo, as a con-
dition of bringing a contested issue or adverse claims to litigation,
thus enabling written instruments, including contracts and sta-
tutes, to be construed without the necessity for prior breach,
thereby preventing future litigation;7±1
(4) to make it unnecessary for a plaintiff to act upon his
own interpretation of his rights and at his peril as a condition of
judicial action, or to forbear from a contemplated but challenged
step for fear of incurring loss, thus avoiding the dangerous neces-
6sSee Attorney-General v. Scott, [1905] 2 K. B. 160, sub. nom. 74
L. J. K. B. 803, 68 J. P. 502, 20 T. L. R. 630.
69Welfare Inv. Co. v. Stowell, (Cal. App. 1933) 22 P .(2d) 529;
Brown v. Levin. (1929) 295 Pa. St. 530. 145 Atl. 593; City of Chester
v. Woodward, (1929) 13 D. & C. (Pa.) 201; Swank Motor Sales Co. v.
Decker, (1932) 4 Cambria Co. R. (Pa.) 28; St. James's Hall, Ltd. v.
London County Council, (1900) 83 L. T. R. 98, [1901] 2 K. B. 250, 70
L. J. K. B. 610, 84 L. T. 568, 49 W. R. 572; In re Robert Grew; Canna-
way v. Cannaway, (1903) 29 Victorian L. R. 324, (1904) 29 Victorian
L. R. 628; The statement made in List's Estate, (1925) 283 Pa. St. 255,
257, 129 Atl. 64, that the declaratory judgment was "provided for the
purpose of having issues speedily determined, which otherwise would
be delayed, to the possible injury of those interested, if . . . compelled
to await the ordinary course of judicial proceedings" is only partly true
and hence misleading, and the assumption or "warning" [in re Cryan's
Estate, (1930) 301 Pa. St. 386, 152 At. 675] that this was its "obvious
purpose" is unwarranted. While this is one of its purposes, it is by no
means its only purpose. Equally questionable is the statement in Miller
v. Currie, (1932) 208 Wis. 199, 205, 242 N. W. 570, 572, quoted in
Schmidt v. La Salle Fire Ins. Co., (1932) 209 Wis. 576, 580, 245 N. W.
702, 703, that "the declaratory judgments act is an effort to provide a
tribunal in which controversies may be determined which could not
otherwise be presented for determination to a court having jurisdiction."
70Kariher's Petition (No. 1), (1925) 284 Pa. St. 455, 131 Atl. 265.
71Supra p. 249, and Washington-Detroit Theatre Co. v. Moore,
(1930) 249 Mich. 673, 229 N. W. 618; Senft's Petition, (1930) 15 D. & C.
(Pa.) 792, 793.
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sity for leaps in the dark or the alternative surrender of legitimate
claims ;72
(5) to remove uncertainty and insecurity from legal relations,
and thus to clarify, quiet, and stabilize them before irretrievable
acts have been undertaken ;73.
(6) to enable an issue of questioned status or facts on which
a whole complex of rights may depend to be expeditiously deter-
mined ;74
(7) to enable interdependent rights involving numerous par-
ties to be settled in a single proceeding ;75
72See Hess v. Country Club Park, (1931) 213 Cal. 613, 2 P. (2d)
782; Washington-Detroit Theatre Co. v. Moore, (1930) 249 Mich. 673,
229 N. W. 618; Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Sahlem, (1930) 254 N.
Y. 161, 172 N. E. 455; Ruislip-Northwood U. D. C. v. Lee, (1931) 145
L. T. R. 208, 95 J. P. 164.
Said Judge Cardozo: "I have been impressed on numerous occasions
with the belief that it has supplied a useful expedient to litigants who
would otherwise have acted at their peril, or at best would have been
exposed to harrowing delay." Letter, April 20, 1928, Hearings. U. S.
Senate, on H. R. 5623, April 27, 1928, p. 55.
"They are not obliged to take the risk of prosecution, fines and
imprisonment and loss of property in order to secure an adjudication
bf their rights." Butler, J., for the Supreme Court in Terrace v. Thomp-
son, (1923) 263 U. S. 197, 216, 44 Sup. Ct. 15, 18, 68 L. Ed. 255.
73
"The general purpose of the declaratory judgment is to serve some
practical end in quieting or stabilizing an uncertain or disputed jural
relation either as to present or prospective obligations." James v. Al-
derton Dock Yards, (1931) 256 N. Y. 298, 305, 176 N. E. 401, 404.
"Its purpose is to afford relief from the uncertainty and insecurity
attendant upon controversies over legal rights, without requiring one of
the parties interested so to invade the rights asserted by the other as to
entitle him to -maintain an ordinary action therefor." Kansas Laws
1921, ch. 168, sec. 6, Rev. Stat. Ann. 1923, ch. 60, sec. 3132; ibid. Hawaii
Laws 1921, ch. 162, Rev. Laws 1925, sec. 2923; and to like effect, Ken-
tucky Laws 1922, ch. 83, Codes (Carroll, 1927) secs. 639a-10.
See also Wingate, Surrogate, v. Flynn, Sec. of State, (1931) 139
Misc. Rep. 779, 781, 249 N. Y. S. 351, 354 (to determine length of term
of elective office, necessary to determine power of defendant to desig-
nate office as open to another election. Said the court: "Future confu-
sion and possible litigation will be avoided by a present determination
of the question here involved. Public officers should have the right to
have their legal duties judicially determined. In this way only can the
disastrous results of well-intentioned but illegal acts be avoided with
certainty"); Wardrop Co. v. Fairfield Gardens, (1933) 237 App. Div.
605, 262 N. Y. S. 95; Girard Trust Co. v. Tremblay Motor Co., (1928)
291 Pa. St. 507, 140 Atl. 506; Taylor v. Haverford Township, (1930) 299
Pa. St. 402, 149 AtI. 639, and opinion below, (1928) 18 Del. Co. R. 537.
74Morecroft v. Taylor, (1929) 225 App. Div. 562, 234 N. Y. S. 2;
Miller v. Currie, (1932) 208 Wis. 199, 242 N. W. 570; Ruislip-North-
wood U. D. C. v. Lee, (1931) 145 L. T. R. 208, 95 J. P. 164.
75A. E. Joy Co. v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., (1923) 98 Conn.
794, 120 AtI. 684; Lawrence v. American Surety Co., (Mich. 1933) 249
N. W. 3; Town Board of Greece v. Murray, (1927) 130 Misc. Rep. 55,
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(8) to enable trustees, executors, receivers, and others acting
in a fiduciary capacity to obtain authoritative guidance and protec-
tion against liability in the administration of their trusts ;76
(9) to enable a creditor or claimant whose interests are jeopar-
dized by attack, challenge, act, or new event, to establish his claim,
and by vindicating his right, to prevent future injury or disad-
vantage ;77
(10) to enable a debtor or person charged with duty, liability,
disability, danger, risk, or forfeiture, to disavow the burden,
charge, or risk, and thus remove the cloud on his rights ; s
(11) to enable an obligor or contractor who maintains that
time or circumstance have entitled him to release from his obliga-
tion to sue the obligee for a declaration of release, complete or
partial ;79
(12) to enable a person claiming his own privilege or im-
munity or his adversary's duty or liability to secure a judicial rec-
ognition of these claims, withbut proceeding to enforcement or
execution, an opportunity as helpful to the pacification of legal
relations in the private as in the public sphere ;8o
223 N. Y. S. 606; Schmidt v. La Salle Fire Ins. Co., (1932) 209 Wis.
576, 245 N. W. 702; Curtis v. Sheffield, (1882) 21 Ch. D. 1, 51 L. J'. Ch.
535, 46 L. T. 177, 30 W. R. 581.70See supra p. 250, and English Trustee Act, 1893, sect. 25, 35, 38;
Order 55, rule 3, Supreme Court Rules. Executors: In re Saillard;
Pratt v. Gamble, [1917] 2 Ch. 401, 86 L. J. Ch. 749, 117 L. T. 545. Re-
ceivers: In re New Chinese Antimony Co., [1916] 2 Ch, 115, 85 L. 3.
Ch. 429, 114 L. T. 989, 60 Sol. Jo. 513.
"7For example, to prevent the loss or dissipation of security or the
running of the statute of limitations: Bard v. Standard Mtge. Corp.
(1932) 119 Cal. App. 509, 6 P. (2d) 582; A. E. Joy Co. v. New Amster-
dam Casualty Co., (1923) 98 Conn. 794, 120 Atl. 684; Everts v. Kepler,
(1927) 9 D. & C. (Pa.) 439; In re Atlantic & Pac. Fibre Importing &
Mfg. Co.; Viscount Burnham v. The Company, [1928] ch. 836, 97 L. J.
Ch. 369, 140 L. T. 18: Doran v. Hannin, (1906) 50 Ir. L. T. R. 186.7 8 Morton v. Pacific Constr. Co., (1929) 36 Ariz. 97, 283 Pac. 281;
Woodward v. Fox West Coast Theatres, (1930) 36 Ariz. 251, 284 Pac.
350; Cloverdale Union High School Dist. v. Peters, (1928) 88 Cal. App.
731, 264 Pac. 273; Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Iseley, (1933) 203
N. C. 811, 167 S. E. 56.79Hess v. Countrv Club Park, (1931) 213 Cal. 613, 2 P. (2d) 782;
Girard Trust Co. v. Tremblay Motor Co., (1928) 291' Pa. St. 507. 140
Atl. 506: Ertel Bieber & Co. v. Rio Tinto Co.. r1918] A. C. 260, 87 L. j.
K. B. 531, 118 L. T. 181, 34 T. L. R. 208; Direct U. S. Cable Co. v.
Western Union Tel. Co.. f 19211 1 Ch. 370. 90 L. J. Ch. 102, 123 L. T.
232, 36 T. L. R. 402; Socidt 6 Maritime et Commerciale v. Venus Steam
Shipping Co., (1904) 9 Com. Cas. 289.
8oFidelity Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Swope, (1927) 274 U. S. 123,
47 Sup. Ct. 511, 71 L. Ed. 959; Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry.
v. Wallace, (1933) 288 U. S. 249, 53 Sup. Ct. 345, 77 L. Ed. 730; Colo-
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(13) to enable public duties and powers to be established with-
out the cumbersome and technical prerequisites of mandamus,
certiorari, injunction, prohibition, or habeas corpus;s
(14) to enable a claimant to choose a mild but adequate form
of relief by declaration in place of drastic and harsh coercion which
he does not desire or need. 2
But the declaratory judgment is not intended as a sedative to
enable fearsome people to "sleep o'nights,"' 3 or to enable or per-
mit the courts to decide abstract, hypothetical, or academic ques-
tions. The court must be alert to establish the fact that the issue
is contested, that the parties have an adverse legal interest in its
rado & Utah Coal Co. v. Walter, (1924) 75 Colo. 489, 226 Pac. 864;
Washington-Detroit Theatre Co. v. Moore, (1930) 249 Mich. 673, 229
N. W. 618; Multnomah County Fair Ass'n v. Langley, Dist. Atty.,(1932) 140 Or. 172, 13 P. (2d) 354; Dyson v. Attorney-General, [1911]
1 K. B. 410, [1912] 1 Ch. 158, 81 L. J. K. B. 217, 105 L. T. 753; Young
v. Ashley Gardens Properties, Ltd., [1903] 2 Ch. 112, 72 L. J. Ch. 520,
88 L. T. 541; West v. Gwynne, [1911] 2 Ch. 1, 80 L. J. Ch. 578, 104 L. T.
759, 27 T. L. R. 444; Devonport Borough Council v. Quartley, [1930]
N. Z. L. R. 884.
As illustration of the pacifying functions of the declaration, see
Knight v. Bolton, [1924] N. Z. L. R. 806, 1043 (action for injunction re-
quiring defendant to remove from plaintiff's land soil which defendant
had allowed to escape and to prevent further escapes). Said Salmond,
J. (at 812): "I do not propose, however, at the present stage either to
grant an injunction or to assess damages. I think that the better
course is merely to make a declaration as to the rights of the parties,
thereby affording them an opportunity of mutual agreement as to the
proper steps to be taken . . . for the purpose of putting the boundary
between these two properties into a safe and satisfactory condition. If
the parties cannot so agree, damages will be assessed and an injunc-
tion granted on further consideration." Cf. opinion of Cozens-Hardy,
M. R. (reviewing opinion of Warrington, J.) in Earl of Dysart v. Ham-
merton & Co., [1914] 1 Ch. 822. See also Hasselbring v. Koepke, (1933)
263 Mich. 466, 248 N. W. 867, where the court, while denying an injunction
to restrain infringement of unused easement of light, nevertheless sua
sponte granted a declaratory judgment determining the rights of the parties.
SiFidelity Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Swope, (1927) 274 U. S. 123,
47 Sup. Ct. 511, 71 L. Ed. 959; Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry.
v. Wallace, (1933) 288 U. S. 249, 53 Sup. Ct. 345, 77 L. Ed. 730; Rob-
inson v. Moser, (1931) 203 Ind. 66, 179 N. E. 270; Little v. Smith,
(1927) 124 Kan. 237, 257 Pac. 959; City of Sturgis v. Christenson Bros.
Co., (1930) 235 Ky. 346, 31 S. W. (2d) 386; Faulkner v. City of Keene,
(1931) 85 N. H. 147, 155 Atl. 195; Graham v. England, (1926) 154 Tenn.
435, 288 S. W. 728; Erwin Billiard Parlor v. Buckner, (1927) 156 Tenn.
278, 300 S. W. 565; Dyson v. Attorney-General, [1911] 1 K. B. 410,
[1912] 1 Ch. 158, 81 L. J. K. B. 217, 105 L. T. 753; China Navigation Co.
v. Attorney-General, [1932] 2 K. B. 197, 101 L. J. K. B. 478, 147 L. T.
22; Ruislip-Northwood Urban Dist. Counc. v. Lee, (1931) 145 L. T. R.
208, 95 J. P. 164: Harcourt v. Attorney-General, [1923] N. Z. L. R. 686.
saSupra p. 244.
83Bailhache, J., in Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Hannay &
Co., [1915] 2 K. B. 536, 84- L. J. K. B. 1465, 113 L. T. 98, 101.
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adjudication, and that by the decision a practical end in clarifying,
quieting, and stabilizing the legal position will be subserved. This
purpose may not appear on the face of the pleadings, but it is the
duty of the judge to call for sufficient facts to enable him to deter-
mine the intent and objectives of the suit and to satisfy himself that
a useful purpose is served by making a declaration of rights.
DISCRETION
The Uniform Act provides:
"The court may refuse to render or enter a declaratory judg-
ment or decree where such judgment or decree, if rendered or
entered, would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving
rise to the proceeding.
8 4
One or two other states add:
"or in any case where the declaration or construction is not neces-
sary or proper at the time under all the circumstances.""5
These rules merely embody the established Anglo-American
practice in all jurisdictions and indicate both the practical and the
remedial scope and limitations of the relief. Yet the discretion
granted, however wide and unlimited in appearance, is a judicial
discretion, hardened by experience into rule, and its exercise is
subject to appellate review.88 It is not proper for a court to re-
fuse a declaration without stating the grounds upon which it acts,
for those very grounds are a matter for appellate cognizance.87
It may be serviceable to attempt to indicate the considerations
which have been advanced to justify the grant or refusal of a
declaration.
During the nineteenth century dicta were occasionally uttered
to the effect that the declaratory judgment would be issued with
caution only. But that policy was announced at a time when the
function of the declaratory judgment was little known. With the
greater use of the declaratory action which marks the twentieth
century and with the ever-growing conviction of its practical util-
84Uniform Act, sec. 6.
SsKentucky, Laws 1922, ch. 83, Carroll's Codes (1927) secs. 639a-6;
Philippines: (ter.) 26 Public Laws 46, Act No. 3736, Nov. 22, 1930, sec. 3.8sColson v. Pelgram, (1932) 235 App. Div. 137, 256 N. Y. S. 640,
(1932) 259 N. Y. 370, 377, 182 N. E. 19; Wightman v. Cousins, [1931] N.
Ire. L. R. 138, aff'd, [1932] N. Ire. L. R. 61.87Whether based on jurisdictional or substantive grounds, the reas-
ons for dismissing a petition should be stated. Where the petition is
dismissed on the merits, the judgment should constitute a declaration
of rights of the parties, nevertheless. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v.
Freedy, (1930) 201 Wis. 51, 227 N. W. 952.
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ity in the solution of legal issues, the policy has changed from one
of conservatism to liberality. The Uniform Act, like most of the
other state statutes, provides:
"This act is declared to be remedial; its purpose is to settle and
to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to
rights, status, and other legal relations; and is to be liberally con-
strued and administered."""
WHEN FAVORABLY EXERCISED. The cases rarely indicate the
special grounds upon which the court's discretion is exercised in
favor of a declaratory judgment. When it is so exercised, it may
be assumed first that all the jurisdictional and procedural prere-
quisites of justiciability are present. In addition, the court must
have concluded that its judgment will "terminate the uncertainty
or controversy giving rise to the proceeding" and that it will serve
a useful purpose in stabilizing legal relations. The wide discre-
tion of the court in moulding the declaration to the needs of the
occasion, unhampered by the issues joined or the claims of coun-
sel,8 9 enables it to respond effectively to those practical require-
ments. It was an empirical demonstration of the practical utility
of the declaration that diverted attention from early form
and formula to substance and policy, so that we find
convenience, 0 expediency, 9 need,9 2 desirability,93 public interest,9
88Section 12. Some state statutes add, "with a view to making the
courts more serviceable to the people." Kansas, Laws 1921, ch. 168,
sec. 6; Hawaii, Laws 1921, ch. 162, Revised Laws 1925, sec. 2923; Michi-
gan, Acts 1929, No. 36, p. 68, Comp. Laws 1929, sec. 13909; Virginia,
Laws 1922, ch. 517, p. 902 Annotated Code 1930, sec. 6140 h. There is
an occasional variation in the phraseology. See Carolina Power & Light
Co. v. Iseley, (1933) 203 N. C. 811, 167 S. E. 56; a "liberal construction
of the Act, to the end that its purpose may be accomplished, is mani-
festly desirable."
89 Stueck v. G. C. Murphy Co., (1928) 107 Conn. 656, 142 Atl. 301.
9 OAusten v. Collins, (1886) 54 L. T. R. 903; London Corporation v.
Horner, (1914) 111 L. T. R. 512.
9
'Leibowitz v. Bickford's Lunch System, (1926) 241 N. Y. 489, 150
N. E. 525, aff'g (1925) 213 App. Div. 874, 209 N. Y. S. 865; Lofthouse
Colliery v. Ogden, (19131 3 K. B. 120, 82 L. J. K. B. 910, 107 L. T. 827,
29 T. L. R. 179; Burghes v. Attorney-General, [1911] 2 Ch. 139, 80 L. J.
Ch. 506, 105 L. T. 193, 27 T. L. R. 433; In the Will of Sayer, [1921]
Victorian L. R. 95, 27 Argus L. R. 30, 42 A. L. T. 137.92 Semenowich v. Melnyk, (1921) 93 N. J. Eq. 67, 115 Atl. 41; Miller
v. Currie, (1932) 208 Wis. 199. 242 N. W. 570.
9 3See Cozens-Hardy, M. R., in West v. Gwynne, [1911] 2 Ch. 1, 80
L. J. Ch. 578, 104 L. T. R. 759, 761, 27 T. L. R. 444: "I cannot imagine
an instance of a more beneficial exercise of the jurisdiction to make a
declaratory order than has been done in this case:' And almost the
same language in Young v. Ashley Gardens Properties, Ltd., [19031
2 Ch. 112, 72 L. J. Ch. 520, 88 L. T. 541.9 41n re Freeholders of Hudson County, (1928) 105 N. J. L. 57, 143
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or policy"5 the common criteria of the grant of the declaration.
NECESSARY PARTIES. Aside from the necessity for proper
parties plaintiff and defendant having conflicting legal interest in
the controversy to be adjudicated, the procedure for a declaratory
judgment vests in the court a wide discretion to insist upon join-
ing and impleading all parties it deems interested or likely to be
affected by the decision, and to dismiss, usually without preju-
dice, a declaratory proceeding instituted without the presence of,
or service upon, all such interested persons.98 The justification for
such discretion is the fact that the declaratory judgment is de-
signed to terminate the controversy or uncertainty sub judice; and
if interested parties are not served or present, it would be likely
to fail of that essential purpose. The court occasionally does give
judgment, notwithstanding the absence of some designated party
defendant, but explains that his interests are not affected by the
decision or that his presence would have added nothing of impor-
tance which the court needed to take into consideration. More
often, however, the court dismisses the proceeding, on the ground
that some designated necessary party' s or parties9 9 should have
Atl. 536; In re Application of School Dist. of Steelton, (1927) 31 -Dauph-
in Co. R. (Pa.) 75; West Midlands Joint Electricity Authority v. Pitt,
[1932] 2 K. B. 1; Harcourt v. Attorney-General, [1923] N. Z. L. R. 686.
95Allen v. Carsted Realty Corp., (1928) 133 Misc. Rep. 359, 231
N. Y. S. 585.
96Section 11 of the Uniform Act provides, in part: "When declara-
tory relief is sought, all persons shall be made parties who have or claim
any interest which would be affected by the declaration, and no declara-
tion shall prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the proceeding."
Nearly all the state statutes contain a similar provision.
The Connecticut, Rules of Practice, sec. 63 (d), provide that no
declaration will be rendered "unless all persons having an interest in
the subject matter of the complaint are parties to the action or have
reasonable notice thereof."
See City of Salem v. Oregon-Washington Water Co., (Ore. 1933) 23
P. (2d) 539 (plaintiff city asked declaration of the validity of its statu-
tory authorization to construct and operate its own water system, cit-
ing as defendants the existing water company, the attorney-general, and
two taxpayers. Upon demurrer that there was a defect of parties de-
fendant, the court expressly ruled that taxpayers were not necessary
parties).
97Hite v. Clark & Snover Co., (1926) 27 Lack. Jur. (Pa.) 225;
Hoffman v. McAbee, (1925) 41 Montg. Co, Law R. (Pa.) 164, 167; Dres-
dner Bank (London Agency) v. Russo-Asiatic Bank, [1923] 1 Ch. 209,
92 L. J. Ch. 204, 128 L. T. 633: New York Life Ins. Co. v. Public
Trustee, [19241 1 Ch. 15 [1924] 2 Ch. 101, 93 L. J. Ch. 449, 131 L. T.
438, 40 T. L. R. 430.
9SEx parte Hirsch's Committee, (1932) 245 Ky. 132, 53 S. W. (2d)
211: Dobson v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp., (Neb. 1933) 247
N. W. 789; Cinema Corp. of America v. Bercovici, (1931) 233 App. Div.
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been heard, not only for the information of the court but because
such a party might be affected by, even though not bound by, the
decision; and in so conclusive a proceeding it would be neither just
nor proper to render a judgment without hearing and binding such
interested person. Any suggestion, of course, that interested par-
ties could be bound by a judgment in a proceeding to which they
were not parties served, with opportunity to be heard, would en-
counter constitutional objections ;100 but although this is conceded,
courts properly decline to make declarations between parties when
others, not bound, might later raise the identical issue and pos-
sibly deprive the declaration of that conclusive and tranquillizing
effect it is calculated to produce.1"' Yet occasionally a court does
render a decision between two parties, notwithstanding that it
does affect a third person, on the theory that such a person is in
effect a stakeholder, and, while interested, would not be adversely
or deleteriously affected, and that hence there is no harm in pro-
ceeding to judgment without him.10 2 Not a little acumen is some-
88, 251 N. Y. S. 130; Sadler v. Mitchell, (1931) 162 Tenn. 363, 36 S. W.(2d) 891; Harrell v. American Mtge. Co., (1931) 162 Tenn. 371, 36 S. W.
(2d) 888; (1930) 161 Tenn. 646, 32 S. W. (2d) 1023; State ex rel. Mil-
waukee" County v. City of .Milwaukee, (Wis. 1933) 246 N. W. 447; Wal-
lace v. Potter, (Alta. 1912) 2 W. W. R. 1085; (1913) 24 W. L. R. 262,
4 W. W. R. 383, 8 D. L. R. 138.
In challenges to statutes and ordinances, the Attorney-General or
law officer must be served and, if the court thinks desirable, heard.
Section 11 of the Uniform Act, with similar requirement in other states,
provides: "In any proceeding which involves the validity of a municipal
ordinance or franchise, such municipality shall be made a party, and
shall be entitled to be heard, and if the statute, ordinance, or franchise
is alleged to be unconstitutional, the attorney-general of the state shall
also be served with a copy of the proceeding and be entitled to be
heard."
99Morton v. Pacific Constr. Co., (1929) 36 Ariz. 97, 283 Pac. 281;
Continental Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cochrane, State Com'r of Insurance, (1931)
89 Colo. 462, 4 P. (2d) 308; State ex rel. Mellott v. Board of Com'rs of
Wyandotte County, (1929) 128 Kan. 516, 279 Pac. 1; Ezzell v. Exall,(1925) 207 Ky. 615, 269 S. W. 752, 211 Ky. 814, 278 S. W. 155; Coke v.
Shanks, (1925) 209 Ky. 723, 273 S. W. 552; Lyons' Adm'r v. Greenblatt,(1926) 213 Ky. 567, 281 S. W. 487: De Charette v. St. Matthews Bank
& Trust Co., (1926) 214 Ky. 400. 283 S. W. 410. To effect that neces-
sary parties can be joined by order of the court, see Stratton v. Beaver
Farmers' Canal & Ditch Co., (1927) 82 Colo. 118, 257 Pac. 1077.
'
00 Faulkner v. City of Keene, (1931) 85 N. H. 147, 155 Ati. 195. 198;
Hair v. Town of Meaford, (1914) 26 0. W. R. 454, 31 Ont. L. R. 124, 20
D. L. R. 475, 6 0. W. N. 115.
101See especially the reasoning of Higgins, J., in State of Victoria v.
The Commonwealth, (1926) 38 C. L. R. 399, 406.102See Durant v. Whedon, (1922) 201 App. Div. 196, 194 N. Y. S.
126: Powers v. Vinsant, (1932) 165 Tenn. 390, 54 S. W. (2d) 938; Bar-
wick v. South Eastern & Chatham Ry. Cos., [1921] 1 K. B. 187, 90
L. J. K. B. 377, 124 L. T. 71, 85 3. P. 65, aff'g [1920] 2 K. B. 387.
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times evidenced in distinguishing cases which require from those
which do not require service upon such interested third person.
WHEN UNFAVORABLY EXERCISED. The two principal criteria
guiding the policy of rendering declaratory judgments are (1)
when the judgment will serve a useful purpose in clarifying and
settling the legal relations in issue, and (2) when it will terminate
and afford relief from the uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy
giving rise to the proceeding. It follows that when neither of
these results can be accomplished, the court should decline to
render the declaration prayed. In addition, and perhaps as in-
dicating when a useful purpose will not be served, statute and
practice have established the rule that the judgment may be re-
fused when it is "not necessary or proper at the time under all
the circumstances."
These criteria of discretion are too general to afford much help
to judges, but precedent and practice have given them definition
and have hardened the discretion into rule, reviewable as such.
Some specification of the grounds advanced for refusing declara-
tions under the discretionary power may therefore be appropriate.
The uncertainty would not be terminated where the proceed-
ings indicate the absence or failure to join necessary parties in
interest who ought to be heard or bound,103 or where there are
not proper adversary parties,10 ' or where the proceedings require
allegation and proof of facts not before the court.10 5 It is per-
haps superfluous to add that the want of any of the jurisdictional
or procedural requisites of justiciability bars the grant of the peti-
tion on technical rather than discretionary grounds. This would
embrace the refusal of courts to decide hypothetical or abstract
questions, on the ground that such a decision would not serve a
practical function in stabilizing relations, and even as advice, which
is not grantable, would not be binding.106
1OaContinental Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cochrane, State Com'r of Insurance,
(1931) 89 Colo. 462, 4 P. (2d) 308; Dobson v. Ocean Accident & Guar-
antee Corp.. (Neb. 1933) 247 N. W. 789, and cases cited supra notes
96, 98 and 99.
104Loughlin's Estate, (1931) 103 Pa. Super. Ct. 409, 157 Atl. 494,
aff'g (1931) 14 D. & C. (Pa.) 670.
105Sunreme Tent of Knights of Maccabees v. Dupriest, (1930) 235
Ky. 46, 29 S. W. (2d) 599; Wardrop Co. v. Fairfield Gardens, (1933) 237
App. Div. 605, 262 N. Y. S. 95: Lockwood v. Lockwood, (1930) 98 Pa.
Super. Ct. 426; Gray v. Lee, (1927) 44 Montg. Co. Law Rep. (Pa.) 1;
Newsum v. Interstate Realty Co.. (1925) 152 Tenn. 302, 278 S. W. 56.
1 0 8Mulcahey v. Johnson. (1927) 80 Colo. 499, 252 Pac. 816; Wardrop
Co. v. Fairfield Gardens, (1933) 237 App. Div. 605, 262 N. Y. S. 95;
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On the ground that the uncertainty would not be terminated,
the courts usually refuse to make declarations where they con-
sider that further proceedings are necessary to enable the plaintiff
to obtain the relief he needs or to make the judgment effective."0 7
On discretionary grounds, courts occasionally decline to render
declaratory judgments when, in a case which might require conse-
quential relief, they feel that they have no jurisdiction or power
to grant such supplemental relief, either because the property in-
volved is beyond the physical boundaries of the state 0 s or because
the court has no power in the premises. 00
The declaration will be refused where in the court's opinion
it is inexpedient, for some reason outside the record, such as
public policy, or where the question might be raised again in some
other way or where it would be embarrassing in the operations of
government. 1 0 It may also be refused where by laches or de-
fault or inequity the plaintiff has weakened his claim to relief,"'
Western Pacific Grain Elevator & Terminals, Ltd. v. Otton, (1924) 35
B. C. 59.
107Brown's Estate, (1927) 289 Pa. St. 101, 137 Atl. 132; Ritter v.
Leach, (1929) 97 Pa. Super. Ct. 386; Lewis v. Green, [1905] 2 Ch. 340,
74 L. J. Ch. 682, 93 L. T. 303;. Connellan v. Connellan, (1905) 39 Ir.
L. T. R. 260; Security Trust Co. v. Wishart, (Alta. 1920) 1 W. W. R.
476. 51 D. L. R. 614; Pawson v. Anderson Sons & Co., (1909) 29 N. Z.
L. R. 113.
108Braman v. Babcock, (1923) 98 Conn. 549, 120 Atl. 150; Bankers
Trust Co. v. Greims, (1929) 110 Conn. 36, 147 Atl. 290; Westchester
Mtge. Co. v. Grand Rapids & I. R. R. Co., (1927) 246 N. Y. 194, 158
N. E. 71.
'
09State ex rel. Baird v. Board of Com'rs of Wyandotte County,(1924) 117 Kan. 151, 230 Pac. 531; Public Service Com'n of Kansas v.
Kansas Gas & Elec. Co., (1926) 121 Kan. 14, 246 Pac. 178; Everhart v.
Provident Life & Trust Co. of Phila., (1922) 118 Misc. Rep. 852, 195
N. Y. S. 388: Nashville Trust Co. v. Dake, (1931) 162 Tenn. 356, 36
S. W. (2d) 905; Board of Supervisors of Amherst County v. Combs,
State Comptroller, (Va. 1933) 169 S. E. 589; Baxter v. London County
Council, (1890) 63 L. T. R. 767, 55 .1. P. 391, 7 T. L. R. 142: Magee,
Adm'r. v. The Queen, (1894) 4 Ex. C. R. 63.
110Brown's Estate, (1927) 289 Pa. St. 101, 137 Ati. 132; Achen-
bach's Estate, (1929) 22 Northam. Co. R. (Pa.) 129; Newsum v. Inter-
state Realty Co., (1925) 152 Tenn. 302, 278 S. W. 56; Ziegler v. Pickett,
(Wyo. 1933) 25 P. (2d) 391; Attorney-General ex rel. Monmouthshire
County Council v. Scott, [1905] 2 K. B. 160; British Ass'n of Glass
Bottle Mfrs. v. Forster & Sons. (1917) 86 L. J. Ch. 489, 116 L. T. 433,
33 T. L. R. 314; Musical Performers' Protection Ass'n v. British Int.
Pictures, Ltd., (1930) 46 T. L. R. 485.
"'Curtis v. Sheffield, (1882) 21 Ch. D. 1, 51 L. J. Ch. 535, 46 L. T.
177; Fussell v. Dowding, (1884) 27 Ch. D. 237, subsea. proceedings
(1884) 27 Ch. D. 237: City of Wichita v. Wichita Gas Co.. (1928) 126
Kan. 764. 271 Pac. 270; Hatzell v. Dover, Jailer, (1925) 208 Ky. 149, 270
S. W. 723.
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or where it would result in possible injustice to third persons.I12
It will be refused where it would be futile or useless under the
circumstances, for example, where the one against whom it is
made is privileged to escape its effects by some action within his
own discretion." 3 As already observed, it will be refused where
it is unnecessary," 4 or where it is not practical for the court to
reach a conclusion, e. g., the effect of a prospective structure, or
where it will serve no practical purpose in terminating uncertainty
or insecurity." Thus, it will not be made "in the air," or in the
abstract, i.e., without definite concrete application to a particular
state of facts which the court can by the declaration control and
relieve. 1 6
All these cases are but illustrations of the general rule that the
declaration is an instrument of practical relief and will not be
issued where it does not serve a useful purpose. The courts neces-
sarily have a considerable judicial discretion in determining when
such a useful purpose will be subserved, a discretion now more fre-
quently invoked since the courts' emancipation from the older
maxims which confined the declaration almost within the narrow
limits of an extraordinary remedy to be administered with caution
and reluctance. Now that liberal construction is enjoined upon
112Lacov v. Ocean Ave. Bldg. Corp., (1931) 257 N. Y. 362, 178
N. E. 559; Board of Trustees of Eastern State Penitentiary v. Gordon,
Sec'y of Banking, (1931) 16 D. & C. (Pa.) 54; Huffman's Estate, (1928)
11 Erie Co. L. J. (Pa.) 302; Austen v. Collins, (1886) 54 L. T. R. 903.
1 3Barraclough v. Brown, [1897] A. C. 615, 66 L. J. Q. B. 672, 76
L. T. 797, 62 J. P. 275; Attorney-General ex rel. Monmouthshire County
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the courts by statute, and that practice has, with rare exceptions,
established the declaration as an optional and alternative remedy,
the principal business of the court is to determine whether in a par-
ticular case it will or will not serve a useful purpose.
CONCLUSION
Since the formal adoption of declaratory judgment statutes in
the United States after the war, some twelve hundred reported
cases have been decided in the United States. They exemplify an
extraordinary range of judicial relief in fact situations of the
greatest variety. In the light of a fifty-year development in Great
Britain, its dominions and possessions and a longer history on the
continent, practitioners and the courts have at their disposal a
wealth of experience rarely associated with a so-called law re-
form. In the protection of diverse legal interests not heretofore
safeguarded, in the determination of issues at their inception or
in narrow compass, thereby averting the full-panoplied battle with
its accumulated bitterness and damage, to which simple issues
often lead, in the adjudication of disputes without the require-
ment of prior violence or breach, in the removal of uncertainty
and clouds from legal relations, and in the supply of a milder for
a drastic remedy, the declaratory judgment has demonstrated its
utility as an instrument of preventive justice and as a valuable
exemplification of judicial therapeutics.
